

AWS
re:Invent

SEC357

Turner's Journey to Scale Securely on a Lean Budget

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Chalktalk repeats

Tuesday, November 27th

Turner's Journey to Scale Securely on a Lean Budget

3:15pm | Aria East, Level 2, Mariposa 8, T2

Wednesday, November 28th

Turner's Journey to Scale Securely on a Lean Budget

4pm | Bellagio, Level 1, Grand Ballroom 1, T1

Related breakouts

Thursday, November 29

SEC319 - Meeting Enterprise Security Requirements with AWS Native Security Services
1-2 | Venetian, Level 2, Titian 2204

Tuesday, November 27

SEC303 - Architecting Security & Governance across a Multi-Account Strategy
4:00 – 5:00 | Aria East, Mariposa 5

Thursday, November 29

SEC349 - Governance at Scale
1:45 – 2:45 | MGM Level 3

Survey time

Turner



[adult swim]



TOONAMI



cartoonito



MONDO TV



GREAT BIG STORY



WARNERMEDIA

AWS
re:Invent

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Turner's story

Then

Executive-driven migration

Lift-and-shift

Limited AWS experience

Automation wasn't our thing

Fewer, bigger accounts

Security was an after-thought

Now

Lots of higher-order services

Optimization matters

Still varying experience levels

Automation is king

Many AWS Accounts

Every Account has an accountable VP

Security Standards & Scorecards

Security Challenges

Inventory, Inventory, Inventory

Who owns what, where is it?

Logging

Threat Detection & Response

Open buckets, open security groups, not a CloudTrail in sight

Tools are really expensive

Tools are hard to deploy

Tools are focused on basic services

Solution?

Building Blocks

Organizations

Security Account

CloudFormation

Cross-account role

Lambda & boto3

Step-Functions, SNS, SQS

DynamoDB & S3

Elastic Search

... and a little later

GuardDuty

Cloudwatch Dashboards


CloudSploit

Trusted Advisor


Accountability

Did ya get that
open Security
Group I sent
you?

Executive Sponsor	Score	Total Spend
Alan Probe	61%	\$44,571.21
Carl Brutananadilewski	96%	\$46,822.29
Frylock	99%	\$1,672.02
Harvey Birdman	99%	\$78.89
Ignignokt	83%	\$2,114.55
Master Shake	97%	\$22,505.57
Meatwad	95%	\$93,151.77
Mentok	93%	\$1,132,425.64
Peter Potamus	96%	\$999.93
Phil Ken Sebben	81%	\$4,157.52
Ryu	91%	\$10,786.92
Dr. Blake Downs	96%	\$27,752.35
Brak	99%	\$28,651.99
Space Ghost	100%	\$1,554.53
Huey Freeman	90%	\$8,602.14
Morty Smith	100%	\$97.45
Rick Sanchez	92%	\$8,992.38
Summer Smith	93%	\$77,998.17
Mr. Meeseeks	84%	\$7,436.16
Pickle Rick	91%	\$9,659.12
MC Pee Pants	51%	\$3,537.44
Peter Potamus	39%	\$183,250.56



[illegible]



Business Impact

Searchable inventory across 218 accounts in 4 Organizations

Trivial on-boarding of acquired company

100% compliant on MFA

Permissive Security groups locked down

Public S3 buckets identified & tagged

AWS Account creation process nearly 100% automated

Cost: \$1k /mo

Lambda invocations and DynamoDB

30min execution frequency

Lessons Learned

API Limits

AWS was much better than our vendors

~~5 minute timeouts~~

DDB Autoscaling

Lambda sizing

Trusted Advisor is the best open bucket check

CloudTrail Encryption

Remember what is regional

Where we're going next


Opensource all this as Antiope


<https://github.com/turnerlabs/antiope>

Focus on services that have Resource Policies

Whatever Andy & Werner announce this week!









Please complete the session
survey in the mobile app.

Thank you!

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Reference Slides

Spray & Pray

```
my_AccountList = AWSAccountList(Inventory_Commit=commit)

for a in my_AccountList.get_active_accounts():
    logger.info("Account: {} ({{}}) is {}".format(a.account_name, a.account_id, a.account_status))
    if a.account_status == "ACTIVE":
        a.create_contact_record()
        try:
            a.test_cross_account_role(os.environ['DEFAULT_ROLE_NAME'])
        except AssumeRoleError as e:
            logger.error(e)
            continue

    # Now trigger the parallel collection of data
    client = boto3.client('sns')
    message = {}
    message['account_id'] = a.account_id
    response = client.publish(
        TopicArn=os.environ['TRIGGER_ACCOUNT_INVENTORY_ARN'],
        Message=json.dumps(message)
    )

return(event_)
```

Spray & Pray

```
TriggerAccountInventoryFunctionTopic:
  Type: AWS::SNS::Topic
  Properties:
    DisplayName: !Sub "Triggers the Inventory of each Account for ${AWS::St

EIPInventoryLambdaFunction:
  Type: AWS::Lambda::Function
  Properties:
    FunctionName: !Sub "${AWS::StackName}-eip-inventory"
    Description: AWS Lambda to to inventory all public IPs in an account
    Handler: inventory_public_ip.lambda_handler
    Runtime: python3.6
    Role: !GetAtt InventoryLambdaRole.Arn
    Code:
      S3Bucket: !Ref pDeployBucket
      S3Key: !Sub ${pLambdaZipFile}

EIPInventoryLambdaFunctionPermission:
  Type: AWS::Lambda::Permission
  Properties:
    FunctionName: !GetAtt EIPInventoryLambdaFunction.Arn
    Principal: sns.amazonaws.com
    SourceArn: !Ref TriggerAccountInventoryFunctionTopic
    Action: lambda:invokeFunction

EIPInventoryTopicToLambdaSubscription:
  Type: AWS::SNS::Subscription
  Properties:
    Endpoint: !GetAtt [EIPInventoryLambdaFunction, Arn]
    Protocol: lambda
    TopicArn: !Ref 'TriggerAccountInventoryFunctionTopic'
```


Cloud Security Standard

IAMConsoleMFA:

description: All IAM Users have MFA enabled for Console Access

human_section_id: 5.01(b)(i)

knowledge_source: CloudSploit

requirement: true

weight: 100

CloudSploit:

Finding: "Users MFA Enabled"

RootAccountUsage:

description: Root account is not used after initial provisioning of AWS account

human_section_id: 5.03(a)

knowledge_source: CloudSploit

requirement: true

weight: 10

CloudSploit:

PassFail: true


Finding:

- "Root Account In Use"
- "Root Access Keys"

Multi Accounts



GuardDuty Multi Account Structure



GuardDuty Findings

Recon

- Port probe on unprotected port
- Outbound port scans
- Callers from anonymizing proxies

Backdoor

- Spambot or C&C activity
- Exfiltration over DNS channel
- Suspicious domain request

Trojan

- Domain generation algorithm (DGA)
- domain request
- Blackhole traffic
- Drop point

Unauthorized Access

- Unusual ISP caller
- SSH/RDP brute force

Stealth

- Password policy change
- AWS CloudTrail logging disabled
- Amazon GuardDuty disabled in member account

Cryptocurrency

- Communication with bitcoin DNS pools
- Cryptocurrency related DNS calls
- Connections to bitcoin mining pool

GuardDuty service role permission

```
{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [
    {
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Principal": {
        "Service": "guardduty.amazonaws.com"
      },
      "Action": [
        "sts:AssumeRole"
      ]
    }
  ]
}
```

```
{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [
    {
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": [
        "ec2:DescribeInstances",
        "ec2:DescribeImages"
      ],
      "Resource": "*"
    }
  ]
}
```

Macie

PII and personal data

Source code


SSL certificates, private keys

iOS and Android app signing keys

Database backups

OAuth and cloud SaaS API Keys

Amazon S3 Overview by DLP Theme - minRisk: (7)



Enterprise Support

